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be significant, however, that since proximate cause is a question of law,
the Polemis rule allows an appellate court considerable leeway in reviewing
cases on appeal, since any fact question can, with some slight manipulation,
be converted into a question of proximate cause. The Wagon Mound"8
rule, foreseeability, sounds more like a question of fact, not easily review-
able, or, if reviewable, review is of necessity limited to the extent of the
liability issue only. In short, it does not afford a convenient device with
which to revise jury tried results. It should be borne in mind, moreover,
that whereas the English courts have adopted this rule, as a parochial
matter, the English have discontinued the jury in the trial of negligence
cases. Thus, the seeming intellectual confusion may be a false issue: what
is really involved here is the control over jury tried negligence cases.
Further, if this analysis is correct, the proximate cause cases will never be
susceptible to precise analysis along conceptual lines because we are not
dealing with pure law, but perforce with reanalyzing the factual setting by
the appellate courts under the guise of proximate cause. If this is true,
therefore, proximate cause cases do not reveal rules of law per se, but
merely illustrate in which factual contests the appellate judges will or will
not sustain jury findings below. Indeed, the proximate cause cases are in
fact very nearly the recorded deliberations of a second jury, the proximate
cause language merely serving as a anodyne to those who believe the jury
supreme in the arena of facts.
Francois R. Cross
A STUDY OF THE "VERSION": A REFLECTION ON THE
COPYRIGHT LAW'S POLICY OF PROTECTION*
I.
INTRODUCTION
The word copyright evokes in the layman and also in the average
lawyer a feeling of monopolistic security. Authors' endeavor to produce
new works encouraged by the belief that a copyright will secure to them
alone the benefit of their labor. As of late, however, there has been voiced
68. This rule was set forth in the case of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Morts Dock & Engineer Co., Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), and limits the liability
of the defendant to those results which are within the risk giving rise to his negligence.
See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
* This Comment is being entered in the 1964 ASCAP Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition at Villanova University School of Law.
1. The term author as used herein will designate one who has created a product
which contains something meritorious from the author's own mind, "embodies the
thought of the author ... and would not have found existence in the form presented,
but for the distinctive individuality of mind from which it sprang." National Tel.
News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co, 119 Fed. 294, 297-8 (7th Cir. 1902).
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much dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of the protection offered
by a copyright. The most vehemently dissatisfied are authors who try to
build upon, improve, or vary subjects in the public domain. Works fall
into the public domain and become available to all members of the public
whenever there is an authorized publication without reservation, or if the
publication is not in conformity with the statutory requirements for copy-
right protection. A work published either in this or in any foreign country
prior to July 1, 1909, for which a United States copyright had not been
previously secured now rests in the public domain. "A work will also fall
into the public domain upon the lapse of time - after twenty-eight years
if renewal is not sought (or is not sought within the time limited), after
fifty-six years if renewal is had."
'2
This comment will deal exclusively with "versions" of works in the
public domain, on the theory that all the dissatisfaction with copyright
protection is reflected and magnified in this narrow area. Through analysis
of the statutory language of title 17 of the United States Code, the policy
behind the code, and the results the courts have reached by an interplay
of one upon the other, an effort will be made to determine what protection
is afforded a "version." And of much more fundamental importance, will
be an attempt to determine whether, when its core has been laid bare by
the analytical knife, copyright protection will prove to be anything more
than a proverbial wax carrot leading the author on by enticing him with
the anticipation of copyright protection, only to have him find when he
secures the copyright and seeks to enjoy its protection that it is not at all
as good as it looked.
II.
PROTECTION OF A VERSION UNDER THE LANGUAGE
OF THE CODE
Literally, a copyright grants to its owner the sole right to reproduce
copies of the work he has registered. The protection necessary to secure
this exclusive right is first invoked when the copyright holder charges
infringement of his copyright. In the typical case the alleged infringer
answers that he has merely used the same public works that had been
used by the copyright holder. The defendant cites section 8 of title 17
of the United States Code3 claiming that any person may freely use all
the works in the public domain because under no circumstances can an
author brand any of the public works with the label of copyright. The
copyright owner invariably contends that the prohibitive effect of section 8
is legislatively limited by section 7's4 pronouncement that a version of
works in the public domain should be regarded as a new work subject to
copyright. The defendant counters with section 3's 5 declaration that
2. HOWZLL, COPYRIGHTS 9 (1949).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
[VOL. 9
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protection is extended only to "the copyrightable parts of the work copy-
righted," relying on the inference that there may exist in the version for
which the copyright claim is made, material to which the copyright
protection does not apply.
Unfortunately no lexicographer has glossarized the terms of the U.S.C.,
and it is quite evident that reliance on the literal wording of the code
results in little more than a stalemate. Therefore, we must look to the
courts to decipher this cryptic "code" and through an analysis of the judicial
treatment of various type versions attempt to isolate the common factors
on which courts rely in granting copyright protection. These common
factors when grouped together should form a standard against which may
be measured the protection which will be afforded a version.
III.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AFFORDED A VERSION
A. Intention
The creation of a version is not precluded by a lack of intention to
make something different. One may intend to make an exact copy of
something in the public domain when the implement slips or some outside
force or inner defect intervenes, and a version is created. Here the courts,
reasoning with overtones of practicality, often find it too difficult "to ascer-
tain what is intended and what inadvertent in the work of a genius: that
a man is colorblind may make him a master of black and white art; a
painter's unique distortions, hailed as a sign of genius, may be due to
defective muscles."
'
But every slip of the chisel, brush, or pen does not create a version
entitled to copyright protection. When the board for an Acy-Ducy game
was copied from the traditional backgammon board there were some in-
advertent defects in shading present in the final product. The Second
Circuit admitted that if an error were made in copying which added a
distinction to the finished product, the author might obtain a valid copy-
right on his version. However, the court found in the case of the mis-
shaded board that the error yielded "nothing new of substance or distinc-
tion" since it was "so minute as to escape the attention of the ordinary
observer,"7 and in general added nothing to the board's worth.
B. The Copy
A copy may be defined as "that which comes so near to the original
as to give every person seeing it the idea created by the original."'8 The
6. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 n.4 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. Ibid.
8. West v. Francis, 5 Barn. & Ald. 737, 743, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363, (K.B.
1822), quoted with approval in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 17, 28 S.Ct. 319, 323 (1908).
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courts have been unanimous in denying copyright protection to that which
is merely a copy of a work which exists in the public domain.9 A game
constructed by merely printing the rules for the game of Acy-Ducy and
copying the traditional backgammon board, all of which had been in the
public domain for years was held not to be a version meriting copyright
protection.10 Facts, whether concerning the actual life of an historic
character" or the geography of a country 12 are all in the public domain,
and no matter what use is made of the facts, they are not rendered a
version. Nor can a version of existing knowledge be created by the mere
recording of that which is available in the fund of common knowledge.
Hence the names and numbers of baseball players combined in a program
were held to be simply copies of information already in the public domain
as to what the lineup had been in other places in prior games played by
the team, even though such program had required labor of assemblage.' 3
The courts differentiate those cases where the subject is a copy of a
work in the public domain that has been transformed by means that allow
the creator's personal reaction to be manifested in the final version. This
differentiation originally pertained to cases involving portraits and was
later extended to photographs. In both types of cases, the courts held that
when the subject of the work was in the public domain others were free
to copy the original. They were not free to duplicate the copy. It is the
"something irreducible, which is one man's alone" that will be protected
under the Copyright Code.14
9. "A copy of something in the public domain will not, if it be merely a copy,
support a copyright." Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159,
161 (2d Cir. 1927). A "word" when used by an author, is but an exact reproduction
of a most basic segment of mankind's common property and does not constitute a
version so as to secure the right to its exclusive use to the author through copyright
protection. "Neither ideas nor phrases nor ordinary English idioms or words are
protected by copyright. They are all in the public domain." Park v. Warner Bros.,
8 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). "The right thus secured by the copyright act is
not a right to the use of certain words, because they are the common property of
the human race, and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sun-
light." Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S.Ct. 606, 607 (1899).
10. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945). The court
in Briggs v. New Hampshire Trotting & Breeding Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H.
1960), believed that the extent to which a sport or game is performed prior to someone
codifying it and seeking copyright protection is an important test as to whether it will
be given copyright protection. Using basketball as an example, the court decided that,
although the organization of the rules and explanation of the technique would involve
a degree of creative thought, the game is played so universally that protection of the
copyright in one person would unfairly hinder the public interest.
11. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
12. The location of township, county, and municipal lines were held to be in the
public domain. Christianson v. West Pub. Co., 149 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945). The
shape of the continental outlines, the lines of longitude and latitude, and the principal
cities of the world are not subject to copyright protection. Sawyer v. Crowell Pub.
Co., 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 735, 65 S.Ct. 74 (1944).
13. Penn Sportservice, Inc. v. Goldstein, 35 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
14. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250, 23 S.Ct. 298, 300
(1902). Such reasoning is no doubt the basis for § 5 of title 17 which allows a copy-
right claim for "reproduction of a work of art." See Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), which holds that a reproduction of a work of art constitutes a
distinct class of copyrightable material.
[VOL. 9
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The idea is the beginning of all projects, of all that is new in business,
art or in the general culture. An idea conceived by the distillation of
knowledge in the public domain may, if properly planted, be the foundation
of a new business or the beginning of a great fortune.1 5 Yet title 17 offers
no protection from theft of this seed. 16
The divergent theories advanced to explain this lapse in the area of
copyright protection divide most readily into the public policy school and
the practical impossibility school. The former relies on the premise that
absent a "means of communicating them [ideas] they are of value to no
one but the author."'17 Before an author publishes his ideas he has perfect
dominion over them. His possession is exclusive. But as soon as his ideas
are crystallized and published, they are given to the world and his exclusive
domain over them ceases.'5 The ideas become the common property of
his audience and can be communicated by them in their own language.' 9
The practical impossibility school, on the other hand, believes that an
idea is valuable and should be protected. But this school must face the
problems of just what is an idea and what distinguishable marks can be
fixed upon a set of intellectual ideas so that one man may call himself a
proprietor thereof. 20 Although each school has had its eloquent disciples
history has shown that it is the public policy school which rules the
judicial roost. Every solution offered2' to answer the practical problems
involved in copyrighting ideas has made precious little headway before
being squelched by a strong public policy argument.
The Copyright Code does secure the right to use an arrangement of
words which the author has selected for the purpose of expressing his
ideas in concrete form.22 Lord Mansfield describes that which is protected
as "an incorporeal right to print a set of intellectual ideas or modes of
thinking, communicated in a set of words and sentences and modes of
15. For an able analysis of the area see Callmann, Unfair Competition in Ideas
and Titles, 42 CALif. L. Rrv. 77 (1954).
16. Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Cal. 1953).
Ideas may be appropriated with impunity since they are free to the world. The idea
of how to stage a show is not protected by copyright. O'Brien v. Chappel & Co., 159
F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (actors were to wear costumes of only black and white) ;
Richards v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 161 F. Supp. 516 (D.D.C. 1958) (a quiz
program was to be based on the recognition of motion pictures).
17. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S.Ct. 606, 607 (1899).
18. Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1959). The copyright gives no exclusive protection to an idea once it
has been disclosed.
19. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Fed. Cas. 201 (No. 13514) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853).
20. These queries were first advanced by Judge Yates dissenting in Millar v.
Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2366, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 235 (K.B. 1769).
21. For a recent suggestion of a "palatable formula.. . our courts can cope with"
see Callmann, supra note 15, at 88.
22. Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F2d 185 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 843, 75 S.Ct. 64 (1954).
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expression. It is equally detached from the manuscript, or any other
physical existence whatsoever. '23
The analogy drawn by Lord Earle in 1854, still remains apt today in
delineating the policy that prompts the courts to decide as they do. He
opined: "the subject of property is the order of words in the author's
composition; not the words themselves, they being analogous to the
elements of matter, which are not appropriated unless combined, nor the
ideas expressed by these words, they existing in the mind alone, which is
not capable of appropriation." 24
A most common way to arrive at a protected version is to express an
idea in a medium other than the medium within which the idea resides
while resting in the public domain. A Santa Claus decoration produced in
life size, three dimensional plastic was held to be protected by copyright
as to those traits which were contributions to prior treatment of the same
subject and were recognizably the author's own. The features of the figure
were held to be part and parcel of the idea of Santa Claus and hence not
protected, but the three dimensional form and the plastic medium were
subject to protection under title 17 since the author was the first to
reproduce the traditional character in this particular way. 25
A printed fabric was held to be a protected version of an embroidered
design in the public domain where the latter had been photographed and
transferred to the former by an engraving and printing process. The
Southern District of New York26 reasoned that the print of a fabric is a
variation from embroidery on a fabric even though the arrangement of the
figure and the other characteristics are elements which may be the same
on both, since otherwise it would be impossible to obtain protection for a
different version of the same work.27
However, a copyright monopoly granted to an author whose product
is merely a further formal development of a generic idea which long ago
had been expressed in concrete form and has long since taken its place in
the public domain would "infringe unduly on public use of the ideas or
objects of that expression. . . . [In such cases] copyrightability may be
altogether denied, or, if copyright is upheld, restrictively protected by
23. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303,2396,98 Eng. Rep. 201,251 (K.B. 1769).
24. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 Clark 814, 867, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702 (H.L. 1854).
25. Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal.1961); Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
26. Millworth Converting Coro. v. Slifka, 180 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). (Mezzotints were held to be versions of
paintings.) See COPINGER, COPYRIGHT 46 (7th ed. 1936). Engravings reproducing
designs of works in the public domain are versions which are protected from infringe-
ment under copyright law.
27. The great majority of courts recognize the technique of embodying a publicidea or theme within a novel medium as a means of achieving a distinguishable version,
but the recognition is not universal. When a miniature version of the theme of a
religious shrine which existed in the public domain was rendered in plaster, a district
court found no cause to give copyright protection sufficient to prevent a second ren-
dition of the same theme also in plaster. Allegrini v. DeAngelis, 59 F. Supp. 248(E.D. Pa. 1944), affd per curiam, 149 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1945).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss3/7
SPRING 1964]
requiring almost verbatim copying to constitute infringement." 28 Thus,
the New Hampshire District Court29 denied copyright protection to one
who used an IBM machine to sort and process betting cards as part of a
race track system. The court held that a product developed for a very
specific purpose by the use of a machine which had been previously used
many times for analogous purposes was not considered a version worthy
of copyright protection.
A court's grant of restrictive protection to the development of generic
ideas in the public domain is illustrated by the Southern District of Illinois'
refusal to grant protection against anything but a verbatim copy of the
copyrighted label showing asparagus, since the generic idea of the label
showing a picture of the vegetables contained within the can had long been
reduced to concrete form and now resided in the public domain. 30
D. The Mechanical Improvement
In the law of patents any improvement which a good mechanic can
make is not the subject of a patent.31 So also, is copyright protection not
extended to any work that differs from a work in the public domain due
to a variation caused by an act which could be performed by anyone in
the particular field.32 In order to receive copyright protection a version
of a musical composition in the public domain cannot merely be a copy of
a piece already produced with additions and variations which any writer
of music with experience and skill might readily make. The addition of an
alto part to a piece of music already having the other three parts would not
make it the subject of a legal copyright, even though the addition resulted
in improvement of the original composition.33
The change of the length of certain notes in a Russian hymn in order
to accommodate the different number of syllables in the English translation,
and the rhythmic changes which were required for the purpose of adopting
the music to the translated text, were not such changes as would constitute
a version entitled to protection when no change was made in the original
harmony or pitch of the notes, and the same tune was retained.' 4 When the
contribution consisted of an introduction, a repetition of the same theme
in the breaks, several bars of harmony and an ending, the district court
in California held that this was merely the addition of certain inconse-
quential melodies and harmonistic embellishments such as are frequently
28. Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
modified on other grounds, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 79 S.Ct. 25,
358 U.S. 816, 79 S.Ct. 25 (1958).
29. Briggs v. New Hampshire Trotting & Breeding Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 234
(D.N.H. 1960).
30. Rochelle Asparagus Co. v. Princeville Canning Co., 170 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.
Ill. 1959).
31. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct.
37 (1941).
32. Cooper v. James, 213 Fed. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
33. Id. at 872, applying the rule laid down in Jollie v. Jacques, 13 Fed. Cas. 910(No. 7437) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850).
34. Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 1936).
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improvised by any competent musician and was "as commonplace . . . as
the fairy story beginning, 'One upon a time.' . . . Such technical im-
provisions which are in the common vocabulary of music and which are
made every day by singers and other performers, are de minimis con-
tributions and do not qualify for copyright protection. '35
Where a photograph is in the public domain, the photographer's effort
to create a distinguishable version by having a walking cane engraved in
the plate from which the photo was printed failed to create a version that
would be protected by copyright. The Seventh Circuit 6 reasoned that
the etched contribution was one which any skilled engraver could have
easily done and which was so slight that it was quite likely to be overlooked
by the casual observer. Furthermore, to allow copyright protection of so
minor a variation would contravene public policy by encouraging deceit
and rewarding chicanery.3 7 The court espoused what might be called a
sauce-for-the-goose-sauce-for-the-gander type test by proposing that since
infringement of a valid copyright could not be evaded by slight and colorable
changes, the copyright protection should not be granted for merely slight
and colorable changes in works already existent in the public domain.38
The courts have moved away from their "Once upon a time" and
"merely mechanical change" reasoning when confronted with certain com-
binations of factors. The federal court for the Eastern District of New
York,39 when faced with a Hebrew Prayer Book the contents of which had
been plucked bodily from publication in the public domain, (the author's
contribution being limited to the addition, deletion, and rearrangement of
letters, words, and sentences), pronounced the work worthy of copyright
protection. The court acknowledged the work was the product of much
labor, judgment, money, and skill on the part of the author, but their
decision rested mainly on the fact that, although the process used could
have been employed by anyone, the finished product in this case was
different from any other book published up to the time, and the differences
were "sufficiently substantial and multitudinous to meet the standard of a
'distinguishable variation'."40 There seeps through the facade of the court's
reasoning the policy of rewarding one who has helped the public by making
a useful contribution. The new text was clearer, more legible, and could
be employed far more purposefully in advancing the culture of the people. 41
Because the standard by which a work is adjudged a version is so nebulous,
the courts are frequently constrained to bolster their decision in close cases
by relying on a form of estoppel. The court here maintained that since
the infringer had shown that he considered the copyright holder's book
a sufficiently improved version by his action of photographing it almost in
35. McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
36. Snow v. Laird, 98 Fed. 813 (7th Cir. 1900).
37. Id. at 817.
38. Ibid.
39. Zelgelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
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its entirety and placing the copy on the market for sale, he was estopped
to deny the contrary.4 2
In the field of music, when the contributions veer away from strictly
mechanical additions and turn more toward the addition of something
unique, the courts are willing to grant copyright protection to products
that differ in words and music from the original, though there exists some
music in the public domain that is quite similar. Under this theory
copyright protection was granted the work of a Sicilian sailor 43 when, while
playing his guitar, a folksong he had heard and forgotten came back to his
memory. Since he could not read music, the words and music he could
remember he played by ear, and what he could not remember he im-
provised. Here the district court invoked an estoppel principle, contending
that there must have been something which the sailor added since his
version brought the song back into popularity with his own people. 4
E. The Compilation
1. The Exactitude
The term exactitude is this writer's and is used herein to denominate
that phenomena which occurs in cases involving directories, maps, guide-
books, or dictionaries; that is, anytime there are certain common objects
of information which must, if recorded correctly, exist in the same terms.45
The map is chosen for discussion in this section, not only because it is
most clearly illustrative of the distinctive features of this subgroup, but
also because of its overwhelming proportional prominence over other
exactitudes in cases raising the issues discussed herein. The unique judicial
treatment given a map makes it appear that today, although other works
may claim the label exactitude, only a map will receive the treatment
that this label calls forth.
42. Id. at 328. In the same year as the Hebrew prayer book case, a Hebrew bible
case came before the federal court for the Southern District of New York. The
changes this time consisted of corrections to the accents and cantillation marks over
the Hebrew characters made on photographic reproductions of pages of a bible in the
public domain. The corrected negatives were made into plates from which a book
was printed. The rules for the work done were well known, and anyone with the
requisite scholarship could have made the corrections. The court's prime reason for
holding the bible a distinguishable variation subject to copyright protection was that
the work had never been done before with complete accuracy. Shulsinger v. Gross-
man, 119 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; see also Consolidated Music Publishers v.
Ashley Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), where a compilation
consisting of selections copied from piano literature in the public domain had as its
distinguishing characteristic a considerable amount of editorial matter such as marks
for fingering, phrasing, and expression. The court found "at least a modicum of
creative work" which was sufficient to constitute a protectible version although it
amounted to a little more than a mere trivial variation. The court was impressed
by the public benefit.
43. Italian Book Co. v. Rossi, 27 F.2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
44. Ibid. That the differences made by the sailor were of "some importance may
be inferred from the plaintiff's commercial success in selling it, and the defendant's
desire to appropriate it."
45. Kelly v. Morris, L.R. 1 Eq. 697, 701 (1866).
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In General Drafting Co. v. Andrews46 the court, after finding a new
map was individual and useful as well as "manifestly different," went on
to find that variation in the road numbering, the shore lines, the position
of towns, the population symbols, and the general scale were those usual
variations necessary to transfer the information into printed form.47 After
diluting the "manifestly different" rationale, the court found that detailed
road information was obtained from engineers in each county, and the
physical conditions of the road were verified by travel, thus denoting the
map a product of a great deal of skill, labor, and expense.48
In the area of exactitudes, the skill, labor, and expense the court is
concerned with is not that expended in the use of judgment, selection,
preparation, and assemblage of information shown on maps already in
existence. In Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,49 although there
was a considerable expenditure of time and effort, it was proven that all
the information, with the exception of the names of a few secondary roads
which had been obtained from a real estate agent, had been gleaned from
other maps. The court held that the publication of information available
to everyone, such as that found on maps, could be secured by copyright
only when the author gathered more than an infinitesimal amount of the
information in the field so that the map's presentation involved at least a
modicum of creative work. 50
Some cases dealing with exactitudes call for a much higher degree of
original research. 51 The district court of Virginia in Marken & Bielfeld
v. Baughman Co.,52 required that a "reasonably substantial portion" of the
information to be used on the map be collected in the field. Other cases
go to the extreme of requiring the compilation to be the sole product of
the maker. This result is prompted by dicta found in the case of Kelly v.
Morris, the first English directory case, to the effect that the author of a
map of an island "must go through the whole process of triangulation just
as if he had never seen any former map."53
Whatever else be the reason behind this latter rationale, one thing is
certain; the courts are not seeking uniqueness in the final product since
two map makers collecting data at first hand would naturally make the
same map.54 If each author is accurate, identity is inevitable since each
seeks only to set down the same facts in precisely the same relation to each
46. 37 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1930).
47. Id. at 55.
48. Ibid.
49. 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951).
50. Id. at 106.
51. Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960).
52. 162 F. Supp. 561, 563 (E.D. Va. 1957); see also Carter v. Hawaii Transport
Co., 201 F. Supp. 301 (D. Hawaii), holding that the outline map of Hawaii, on
which was indicated the sites of cities and hotels along with descriptions of points
of interest and information as to activities on the island, was not subject to copy-
right production since a really substantial portion of the information had not been
acquired by the author from the field.
53. L.R. 1 Eq. 697, 701 (1866).
54. BOWKZR, COPYRIGHT, ITS HIsToRY AND ITS LAW 225 (1912).
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other.55 It would seem that in the area of exactitudes the courts are most
interested in accuracy. If the only source material used is other maps,
there is reflected in the finished version all the errors of the source and not
conformity with reality. Therefore, since accuracy can best be incorporated
into a map by field work, and since accuracy is the quality that makes a
map beneficial to the public, it is logical that protection be given only to
those who seek accuracy in the maps they make by direct reference to
the original sources.56
2. Arrangements and Collections
The basic rationale originally governing the question of whether a
compilation (excluding exactitudes) was to be given copyright protection
seemed to hinge upon whether the author had expended labor in its prepara-
tion. The early courts were not concerned with whether the materials
which the author had collected consisted of matter already in the public
domain, or whether such material showed literary skill, or was unique in
thought or expression, or was anything more than the result of industrious
collection. 57 However, as late as 1920 some courts still refused to recognize
that arrangement of any kind or degree was such labor as would be worthy
of copyright protection as a distinguishable variation of works in the public
domain. In a Second Circuit case"8 there was suspicion that the defen-
dant's printer had set up his pamphlet from a copyrighted pamphlet.
Both pamphlets contained pictures of Pershing on the cover, both contained
the same poems (permission for publication having been secured from the
author), and both had the same number of pages, as well as an identity of
pagination. The court held that although the defendant's conduct may have
been "mean" he was not guilty of infringement since the copyright holder's
attractive "get-up" and sequential distribution were not protected against
infringement under the copyright.59 But in only a few years6 ° most courts
55. Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
56. The biggest difficulty in including maps under the heading of compilation arises
when a map is constructed solely on the basis of field work, since then it must be
technically termed an original work and not a compilation. When the courts are faced
with an exactitude of a work in the public domain, the exactitude in question having
been produced by the author in conformity with the sole product theory (requiring
the author to start from scratch) as prescribed by Kelly, they turn not to the version
theory under § 7 of the Copyright Code, but rather depend on a literal interpretation
of § 8. The prohibition in § 8 against a copyright subsisting in the original text of
any work in the public domain is held to be totally inapplicable to an exactitude
produced wholly from field work "because such a work is not the 'original' text of
any work in the public domain, but a second equally 'original' text of a work never
published before its copyright." Id. at 149.
57. See the analysis of early cases collected in Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v.
Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
58. Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 Fed. 373 (2d Cir. 1920).
59. Id. at 375.
60. There existed even in the earliest cases decided under the Copyright Code an
underlying sentiment that the arrangement of compilations was labor productive of a
variation subject to copyright protection. In Banks Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op.
Pub. Co., 169 Fed. 386 (2d Cir. 1909), the court, while denying a court clerk protec-
tion for his arrangement of cases, it being done as part of his employment, acknowl-
edged that "the trend of some of the decisions and of the text-writers indicates that
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had evolved to a position of extreme liberality, the extent of which may be
judged by the holding of the Second Circuit 61 that, although trade mark
illustrations were not copyrightable in their own right, when they were
gathered together and arranged in a compilation, their arrangement became
subject to protection under the copyright of the compilation.
There has always been a very liberal policy regarding what constitutes
a protected version when there is only limited source material available.
Gothe is believed to have said, "Gozzi maintained that there can be but
36 tragic situations. Schiller took great pains to find more, but he was
unable to find even so many as Gozzi. ' '6 2 Thus it has been held that,
although a plot set in the Canadian Northwest with the Royal Mounted
Police as characters was in the public domain, the situation might be so
manipulated as to constitute a version worthy of copyright protection,
thereby preventing another from making use of the same sequence of events
to excite by representation the same emotions.63
Probably every conceivable plot has been the subject of many book5,
however, people will continue to write books, and the public will continue
to read them because of the new characters and setting in which the
authors shroud the old plot. These settings, which are the independent
production of the author, are protected by copyright. The courts have
held that in such situations it is not the subject that is protected, but rather
the treatment of the subject that is secured by the copyright.6 4
Facts concerning the actual life of an historic character are in the
public domain and not entitled to copyright protection," however, the
fictionalization of events and incidents in the life of an historic figure is
subject to protection against appropriation by others. 66 The association,
arrangement, and combination of historic data is a distinguishable varia-
tion6 7 of the treatment of such data and as such, is worthy of copyright
protection against a mirroring of the style and manner in which the author
has chosen to set down the factual and historical materials. 68 In such case
an arrangement of the material matter of a book [in the public domain] may be the
subject of a valid copyright." Id. at 390; see also Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 Fed.
375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913), where the court admitted that the format and sequence
of a monologue was the subject of copyright protection, but limited the protection
so that it was effective only against substantial appropriation.
61. Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
62. International Film Service Co. v. Affiliated Distributors, Inc., 283 Fed. 229, 233
* (S.D.N.Y. 1922), quoting from POLTI, Tim THIRTY-SIx DRAMATIC SIrUATlONS (1921).
63. Id. at 234, citing Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1138 (No. 3552)(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) ; see also Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864 (2d Cir. 1914).
Even a single scene of a play might display so marked a series of incidents produc-
tive of dramatic effect as to be singularly worthy of copyright protection. Daly v.
Webster, 56 Fed. 483 (2d Cir. 1892).
64. Stephens v. Howells Sales Co., 16 F.2d 805, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); see
McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 Fed. 48 (5th Cir. 1924), where the dramatization of
a Hawthorne book was held not to confer on its author protection against another
author's use of that part of Hawthorne's book that was in the copyright owner's play.
65. See text supra at note 11.
66. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
67. But see, Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 140 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Cal.
1956), where the sequence of historical events of Wyatt Earp's life was not protected
on the rationale that sequences of historical events are literally in the public domain.
68. Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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the copyright does not protect the entire work,6 9 but extends only to those
matters which are the result of the author's independent labor, skill,
and ingenuity.70
The liberality shown by courts in extending copyright protection to
versions in the field of music no doubt stems from the difficulty in arriving
at something completely new, the range of possible variations being so
limited.7 ' "Similarity of tone succession, which is, to a certain degree,
inevitable in all musical composition, because of the limits of the chromatic
scale,"'72 is most likely to appear within the narrow pattern of the chorus
in a popular song. Slight variations in the use of rhythm or harmony -
accent or tempo - or any spontaneous result of the author's imagination,
may transform the version of the work in the public domain into a dis-
tinguishable variation worthy of copyright protection.7 3
Just because the field is narrow does not always mean that the
arrangement and the sequence of the material will be protected. However,
flash cards consisting of basic number combinations have been protected
as to their selection, arrangement, and combination. 74 But there were
additional factors present in the case that permitted the court to skirt the
issue of considering the cards as merely products of a mechanical process.
The set was held to be more than a mere compilation since the combination
of problems plus test sheets, together with instructions constituted an
educational book.75 But the resemblance of the whole method to a mere
mechanical procedure compelled the Seventh Circuit to strengthen their
argument with a form of estoppel, to wit: "the commercial success of
plaintiff's flash card sets .. . [indicates] they were new and useful" ;76
although in reality the success was due to the plaintiff's appeal to a
previously untapped market by promoting the card sets as toys. 77
3. The Abridgment
An abridgment is the highest order of compilation. By gathering,
assembling, and synthesizing data relevant to a particular area the abridger
produces not just a collection of selected extracts, but rather a miniature
epitome of the work in the public domain. Where an auto-supplier gathered
details as to the specific features of auto supplies which he sold, condensed
the mass of data, and synthesized the condensation, the resulting descrip-
tion which was printed in a catalogue was held to be protected by copy-
69. Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
70. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
71. All popular songs are built on the rather simple pattern of a three part chorus
consisting of "an opening strain which usually runs for eight bars, a middle tune of
eight bars, and a concluding eight bars which repeat the first strain." SHAFTNR,
MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 155, 171 (1939).
72. Hirsh v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
73. Ibid.
74. Gelles Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied 373 U S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 1303 (1963).
79. Id. at 147.
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 145.
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right."' The more familiar subject of an abridgment is a literary work
in the public domain. It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrange-
ment of parts of an original work, so as to bring it into smaller compass,
will not be held to be abridgment subject to copyright protection. "There
must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual
labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the
scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of
the original work.' '7 9 To constitute a true and proper abridgment of a work,
the whole account must be preserved in its proper sense.
IV.
THE COPYRIGHT LAW'S POLICY OF
PROTECTION IN PERSPECTIVE
As a survey of the cases shows, most of the confusion and dissatisfac-
tion with copyright protection arises because authors have failed to grasp
the primary purpose prompting the government to issue copyrights. The
belief has developed that the primary purpose for the copyright law is to
secure to the author a monopoly, more or less in the nature of a reward for
his genius and industry. Unfortunately, this belief erroneously puts the
emphasis on personal gain rather than on the common good. The all
pervading public policy emphasis employed by the courts throughout the
area of copyright stems from article one of the United States Constitution
which authorizes the issuance of copyrights "To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors ...
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ... ."80 The primary
purpose of title 17, as even the most cursory reading of the authorizing
clause in the Constitution will show, is to grant the valuable copyright in
order "to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works
of lasting benefit to the world." 8' The reward to the owner is of secondary
importance.8 2 In the analysis of every copyright case the interplay of the
author's rights against the public benefit must be considered in determining
just what rights are secured to the author by his copyright. The way the
copyright-protection equation is set up the author is fully protected up until
the time his monopoly infringes on the master scheme of public benefit.
To retain this delicate balance the courts employ two doctrines whenever
the author's monopoly is disproportionate to his product's benefit to the
public. Depending on the circumstances at the time of trial the monopoly
will either be limited by the doctrine of fair use, or augmented by the
estoppel principle.
A thorough analysis of the enigmatic doctrine of fair use will not be
attempted here. The subject is treated only to the end that some clarity
78. B&B Auto Supply, Inc. v. Plesser, 205 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
79. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
81. Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36, 59 S.Ct. 397, 400 (1939).
82. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd, 239 F2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 43, 78 S.Ct. 667 (1958).
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may be' brought to the ramifications of the interplay of the doctrine and
copyright protection. Fair use has been defined as "a privilege granted
by the court to those other than the owner of the copyright to use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner. '8 3 It should be noted that the
doctrine is not a modification of the copyright protection sanctioned by
the copyright statute. In fact, the term fair use is not even mentioned in
title 17. It is a court created doctrine.
The estoppel doctrine is also court created, having no basis in title 17.
In an infringement case the court is deciding whether to sustain a copy-
right claimed in time past; its attention is thus directed at the time when
the copyright was registered. The question should be "at the time this
version was offered for copyright did it meet the standards of public
benefit"? That is what the question should be; however, as a reading of
the foregoing sections will make quite evident, the deciding factor in
many cases is merely the public acceptance of the work as a version; an
occurrence that may post-date the application date by years. Yet this
acceptance (whether the court finds it exemplified by the infringer's act
of copying a prayer book, or evidenced by the natives whistling a song,
or parents buying a toy) is held sufficient to estop the infringer from
denying that the work from which he copies was a version.84
A survey of the cases also points up a second cause for the dissatis-
faction with the protection afforded copyrighted versions. The stalemate
caused by a literal interpretation of the language in the Copyright Code
best illustrates the necessity for distinguishing the two different levels of
the copyright procedure with which the word protection has been ambigu-
ously associated. If an author takes matter from the public domain and
adds to it matter which resulted from his own endeavors, combining the
two into a work which he copyrights, "the copyright is not void because
of the inclusion therein of the uncopyrightable matter, but is valid as to
the new and original matter which has been incorporated therein."85 So
the courts have held that a copyright will be granted to a whole version
if any portion of the version is found to be a "distinguishable variation" ;86
however, "the degree of protection afforded by the copyright is measured
by what is actually copyrightable in it; that is, by the degree and nature
of the original work."8 7 Just what constitutes this "original work" is
determined by a standard that glides chameleon-like through the many
mansions in the house of copyright. In the compilation suite it is labor;
in the map room it is accuracy; in the library, difference; in the con-
servatoire, imagination; and in the game room it is distinction. Only in the
83. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944); see also Crume v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755,
64 S.Ct. 1265 (1944) ; HOWtLL, COPYRIGHTS 13 (1949).
84. See text supra at notes 42, 44 and 76.
85. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1922).
86. "A 'copy of something in the public domain' will support a copyright if it is
a distinguishable variation'." Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951), quoting from Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc.,
23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
87. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1922).
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hall of mirrors does the chameleon see his true reflection as the something
irreducible which is one man's alone.
V.
CONCLUSION
The standard which the courts apply in determining whether a version
is copyrightable may be said to be two-fold. Protection is extended to
that material within the version which meets the very liberal test of being
the author's alone. But the degree and nature of that protection will
be reflective of the extent to which the "something irreducible" is the
materialization of an endeavor which deserves encouragement because its
product is beneficial to mankind. The courts in applying this binate
standard use the equalizers of fair use and estoppel to keep the scales of
copyright justice in a balance that is in keeping with the policy underlying
the whole of copyright law.88
Confronted with the standard used by the courts to determine what
is protected in a copyrighted version it becomes impossible to deny that
the protection given by a copyright is anything more than the proverbial
enticing carrot. But is the carrot wax? Only to the unknowing, the
uncomprehending - for satisfaction is only the realization of anticipation -
and anticipation under the copyright law must only be for a reward of
secondary importance as provided for in the authorizing clause of the
Constitution. "Copyright property under the federal law is wholly statutory
and depends upon the rights created under the acts of Congress passed in
pursuance of authority conferred by . . . the Federal Constitution." 9
Copyright protection should not be confused with any common law right.
Congress created a new and independent right and did not simply sanction
a pre-existing one.90 Thus the protection given to the copyrighted version
is only such as the statute confers,91 and may be enjoyed only on the terms
and conditions specified therein.92
The courts have been given the task of interpreting this statute; they
have also been provided with a policy in whose light the interpretation is
to occur. As has been shown, the courts, in the main, have been very
faithful in effectuating that policy. When viewed in this perspective the
copyright law's protection is far from waxen.
James M. Salony
88. "The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to
effecting the purpose intended by Congress. They ought not to be unduly extended
by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be conferred, nor so
narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Con-
gress intended to grant." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre
Co., 59 F.2d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 1932).
89. Id. at 72.
90. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 30 S.Ct. 38 (1909);
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 589 (1834).
91. In the last analysis all copyright cases turn upon the construction of the
statute. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319 (1908).
92. New York Times Co. v. Star Co., 195 Fed. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
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